Theorizing with a Purpose: The Many Kinds of Sex by Haslanger, Sally
Haslanger          2 June 2015 1 
Theorizing with a Purpose: The Many Kinds of Sex 
Sally Haslanger 
MIT 
 
Abstract 
The idea of a natural kind purports to be of something that constitutes “the world’s joints” and is 
captured in good explanations. Traditionally, natural kinds are assumed to be “mind-independent.”  But a 
plausible account of explanation takes it to be a practice of asking and answering questions.  Explanations 
should be evaluated as answers to legitimate questions; good answers are not always in terms of “mind-
independent” kinds.  Drawing on the example of sex, this paper explores some of the ways differences in 
the word are either marked or created by us, and how these differences matter for our explanatory 
purposes.  I argue, following Epstein (2015), that explanatory kinds can be both anchored and grounded in 
social facts and, moreover, that explanatory projects – like other practical projects - depend on theoretical 
scaffolds to provide means toward our ends. 
 
1.  Introduction1 
The idea of a natural kind has a complicated history full of controversies and confusions.  It 
would seem that, at least within one tradition, the idea purports to be of something that plays connected 
metaphysical and epistemological roles.2  First, metaphysically, natural kinds are “mind independent” and 
they constitute “the world’s joints.”  Second, epistemologically, good explanation depends on tracking 
natural kinds.  Because natural kinds are responsible for the structure and behavior of the world, our 
explanations of how the world works can only be adequate if they capture this structure.  If we further 
assume that sometimes we come up with good explanations, it must be that we are in a position to have 
knowledge of at least some of the natural kinds.  
 So far this reconstruction doesn’t make clear why we must think that the world’s joints are “mind-
independent.”  Suppose reference to humans, human minds, and human artifacts are important in 
explanations of how the world works.  This would seem to be a fairly obvious claim.  Why are there 
cockapoos?  Why don’t cockapoos shed like other dogs?   Presumably because humans bred cockapoos, 
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and bred them to have hair, instead of fur, because hair sheds very little, and many humans are allergic to 
dog fur.  Dogs are wonderful companions, but allergic reactions are unpleasant.  The existence of 
cockapoos depends on humans and, importantly, cockapoos wouldn’t exist if humans didn’t both enjoy 
dogs and dislike sneezing, runny noses, etc.  Our preferences have an impact on the world.  We create and 
manipulate parts of the world and change how the world goes on.  We design our pets and our pets make 
us happy.  (Of course this does not mean we should objectify them!) 
 The simple explanation of the existence of cockapoos and their hair should be sufficient to show 
that there are some “mind-dependent” things, e.g., our preferences, that are important in explaining the 
existence and properties of some things in the world, i.e., cockapoos; and there are some artifacts or (in 
some sense) “mind-dependent” kinds, e.g., cockapoos, that explain regularities in our moods, behavior, 
and consumer behavior.  So maybe we ought to give up the idea that natural kinds must be “mind-
independent.”  Natural kinds are just those kinds that play a role in good explanations.  If we go this route, 
it might be odd to use the term “natural” in “natural kinds,” since kinds may be psychological, social, or 
artifactual.3  So possibly we should switch to the term “explanatory kinds.”  This would allow us to avoid 
taking any random collection of things, or any disjunctive (gruesome) property, to constitute a kind, while 
also being properly inclusive. 
 Of course the traditional defender of natural kinds won’t accept this train of thought.  There are 
several different exit points on the train.  One is to claim that my explanation of the existence of 
cockapoos and of the happiness they give us aren’t really “good explanations.” They are just “folk” 
explanations, or “common sense” explanations.  Cockapoos aren’t a natural kind.  Moods aren’t natural 
kinds. To get good explanations and so to discover natural kinds we have to consult SCIENCE, probably 
physics.  Or perhaps we must consult metaphysicans who discover the world’s joints in providing 
fundamental explanations. (Barnes 2014; Sider 2015)  Another exit point is to challenge the notion of 
“mind dependence” I’m relying on.  I seem to be relying on causal “mind dependence,” but that’s the 
wrong kind.  The existence of cockapoos depends on our preferences, but not in a way that makes 
cockapoos less than fully real, or non-objective.  When we claim that natural kinds are “mind-
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independent,” we mean something else.   Those taking this second exit could grant that psychological 
states and cockapoos form natural kinds because they aren’t mind-dependent in any “spooky” way.   On 
this approach the worry is that there is a different sort of mind-dependence that is a problem, and natural 
kinds can’t be mind-dependent in that way. 
 In what follows, I am going to consider the first of these two exit strategies, viz., that natural 
kinds are all and only those kinds that we rely on in giving a special privileged form of explanation, a 
form that is capable of getting at the “real,” “mind-independent,” joints in nature.  The second exit, 
prompted by the fear of “spooky” mind-dependence, has been discussed fruitfully in Rosen (1994). I will 
argue that if we want to understand what there is in the world and how the world works, we need a variety 
of forms of explanation that are responsive to our interests and purposes.  Nevertheless, if we are more 
pluralistic about explanation, we can still be realists about kinds, including psychological kinds, social 
kinds, and artifact kinds. 
2. Theorizing 
Theories, as I understand them, consist of sets of propositions, or sets of beliefs.  But the activity 
of theorizing isn’t just a matter of collecting truths.  If I come up with a list of random truths, even a list 
of all the actual truths, this doesn’t count as a theory.  I will not take on the task of defending this 
approach, but it may be useful to highlight some of its assumptions (See, e.g., Anderson 1995a, 1995b; 
Longino 1990; Garfinkel 1990). 
1)  Theories are answers to questions. 
• There can be better or worse questions, so the question itself may need to be defended as a 
legitimate starting point, e.g., what are its presuppositions? 
• Questions are motivated.  And there are good and bad reasons for asking questions.  The reasons 
for asking the question, the intended use of the answer, the context for asking, the question’s 
presuppositions, should all be explored and evaluated. 
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2) An adequate theory is not just a jumble of truths, but a collection of significant truths that bear on the 
question. 
• Truths can fail to be significant because they are irrelevant, misleading, partial, trivial, etc., even 
if belief in them is justified.  In courts we ask for “the whole truth and nothing but the truth” 
because sometimes a selection of truths that does not do justice to the phenomenon for the 
purposes of the inquiry is as bad as a falsehood  (Anderson 1995a). 
• Oftentimes, but not always, theories are produced to give explanations, i.e., they answer questions 
calling for an explanation.  There are different kinds of explanatory questions, e.g., not all ‘why’-
questions are alike, and other ‘wh-’ and ‘how’-questions are also requests for explanation. 
3)  Theorizing is a practice that has goals or purposes.  What counts as a reason within the practice 
depends on its rules and norms.  The practice itself – its ends and what it employs as means – is also open 
to critique. 
• Even if the individual inquirer or researcher is driven by individualistic purposes, e.g., simply to 
make money, the adequacy of a theory will depend the the goals and purposes of the theoretical 
practice or discipline of which it is a part. 
• Whether a truth is significant will partly depend on the goals/purposes of the theorizing as well as 
the question being asked.  For example, a significant truth in medicine depends on the goals of 
promoting human health and well-being.  The contextual values of medicine – in addition to the 
constitutive values of science, such as coherence, simplicitly, empirical adequacy, etc., 
legitimately matter for determining whether or not the theory is adequate.  
• Although some questions that arise in theorizing are internal to a paradigm and may not have 
direct practical implications, the tradition or paradigm should be evaluated in terms of the 
questions it allows us to raise (or doesn’t), the methods and resources it offers, the answers it 
renders intelligible (or doesn’t). 
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4)  An important feature of significant truths is that the terms/concepts used to express/cognize them are 
apt, i.e., they capture the important features of the phenomenon that enable us to answer the question 
guiding the inquiry.  This may require introducing new terms/concepts.   
• Scientific theorizing is continuous with ordinary, “folk,” or common sense theorizing.  There may 
be special methods, equipment, presuppositions, norms, expertise, and the like in science labs, but 
the project of science is continuous with the everyday project of getting along in the world. 
5)  Putting this together in a way that provides placeholders for various desiderata: A good theory will 
select among the [evidentially justified][truths]4 those that are [apt for the purposes of the inquiry] and 
will [organize them] [to do justice to the issue] posed in [a legitimate question(s)] as [suited to the 
context].5  
3.  Theoretical Tools: Distinctions and Differences, Anchors and Grounds6 
In order to be clear in discussing the role of kinds in explanation, let’s use the term ‘distinction’ 
and ‘distinguish’ or ‘classification’ and ‘classify’ for the linguistic/conceptual acts of noting or marking 
differences, and the terms ‘difference’ and ‘differentiate’ for the ontological basis for distinctions when 
they are apt, i.e., we distinguish objects, properties, relations or kinds that are different; our distinctions 
aim to capture what differentiates the kinds we’re interested in.  For example, Granny Smith apples are 
different from Fuji apples in color and taste.  We distinguish between these kinds of apple by using the 
terms ‘Granny Smith’ and ‘Fuji’.  We may distinguish these kinds of apple for agricultural or economic 
reasons, or because some prefer tart apples and other sweet.  Some humans or communities of humans 
may not distinguish these two kinds of apple at all – they may be unfamiliar with apples and not realize 
they come in different varieties.  But even if we don’t have the words to distinguish them, there are color, 
taste, and agricultural differences between them. 
On my view, the world is replete with things, and parts, fusions, sets, collections, and properties 
of things.  Differences abound. There are more divisions than we could ever note or care about.   We 
distinguish things by classifying them, and classification is a human activity and can be done in better or 
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worse ways.  As sketched in §2, the adequacy of a classification will depend on a variety of factors.  
Theoretical and practical norms will have different weights depending on the task. 
For example, suppose that after lobbying from the town’s dog owners, the local animal 
commission has designated two areas at the town dog park, one for dogs over 20lbs, the “Big Dog” 
area, and one for dogs under 20lbs, the “Little Dog” area.  This allows the little dogs to have space to 
run around and play, and puppies to be socialized, without being trampled by the big dogs.  In this task 
they were appropriately guided by some epistemic goals (it is important to determine what makes 
mixing the big dogs and little dogs difficult for dogs and owners), and some practical goals (the 
commission should be responsive to the community’s interests, but also have a policy that is 
manageable to enforce). The commission decided that the “20lb rule” (strictly, that dogs weighing 
>20lbs are not allowed in the “Little Dog” area) was the differentiating feature that best served the 
purpose at hand.  Of course, there is plenty of room for ongoing disagreement both about the 
overarching purpose, or about how best to fulfill that purpose.  For example, should dogs weighing 
over 20lbs that are elderly or recovering from surgery be allowed in the “Little Dog” area? 
Notice that although the commission decided what condition should divide the two areas, the 
condition itself concerns the weight of the dog.   The condition is “up to us,” i.e., it is up to the 
commission, but what satisfies the condition is not.  Drawing on recent work by Brian Epstein 
(2015a), we might distinguish the anchoring fact for the “Little Dog” area and the grounding fact.  
The anchoring fact is the decision we made to use the “20lb rule” as the condition for inclusion in the 
“Little Dog” area.  This decision creates a frame within which there is a right or wrong about whether 
a particular dog belongs in the “Little Dog” area.  The anchoring fact, however, should be 
distinguished from what grounds or constitutes the kind “little dogs.”  Little dogs are those who 
weigh less than 20 lbs.  In this case the anchoring fact is social (about what we decide), but the 
grounding fact is not (weighing more or less than 20lbs is a physical fact).7 
Additional questions may arise when we come to apply the condition for inclusion in the “Little 
Dog” area.  Since there is no scale at the park, people will have to rely on collaborative practices and 
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good faith, and sometimes animal commission officers, to make judgments.  If this fails, there may be 
reason to distribute special tags to dogs who weigh <20 lbs, though with fluctuations in weight and 
growing puppies, this will be a fallible criterion. 
We began with a contrast between distinctions and differences, and we’ve added to this: 
• purposes for drawing the distinction or noting the differences, e.g., wanting to protect little dogs;  
• conditions that differentiate members of the sets in question and provide a ground or basis for the 
distinction, e.g., weighing more or less than 20lbs; 
• anchors that underwrite or establish the link between the conditions and the kind, e.g., that the 
animal commission (reasonably?) decided on 20lbs as the cut-off for “little dog”8; 
• (epistemic) criteria we use to conclude that the conditions are met, e.g., wearing a “little dog” tag; 
• terminology to mark the distinction, e.g., ‘little dog’ and ‘big dog.’   
For each of these there are relevant norms and potential for debate: We can ask whether the purposes for 
drawing the distinction are legitimate (what about disabled dogs? elderly dogs?), whether the conditions 
are apt given our purposes (is 20 lbs too large?), whether the anchors are sufficient or authoritative 
(how did the Commission make this decision?), whether our criteria are reliable (do we need a scale at 
the park?), and whether our terminology is rhetorically comprehensible and effective (is a 21 lb dog 
really a “big dog”)? 
4.  Sex 
One of the longstanding debates in feminist theory is whether males and females, men and 
women, constitute natural kinds, i.e., whether sexes and/or genders are natural kinds (Mikkola 2012).9  
There is general consensus that gender is socially constructed, and substantial disagreement about sex.  In 
§1, we took on the idea that good explanations track kinds (leaving off the distracting qualification 
‘natural’).  In §2, I made the suggestion that a good theory will select among the truths those that are apt 
for the purposes of the inquiry and will organize them to do justice to the issue posed in a legitimate 
question(s) as suited to the context.  Explanatory theories will employ terms and concepts that are apt for 
the purposes of the explanatory demand raised by the question.    
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Human sex differentiation occurs within a framework of social meaning.  An infertility specialist 
and an intersexed teen have different purposes and interests that will lead them, reasonably, to different 
conclusions about what sex is.  Because there are different frameworks of social meaning, different ways 
of drawing sex differences will be adequate to those frameworks. It does not matter whether those who 
employ different frameworks in different contexts agree unless they need to communicate; and when 
they need to communicate, there are mechanisms available to disambiguate their terms (though not 
always effectively employed!).  What matters is whether their conclusions about what sex is give good 
answers to their questions, where good answers involve tracking the parts of reality that do the needed 
descriptive, explanatory, normative work (Anderson 1995a; Elgin 1997, Introduction, Ch 1, Ch 11).  A 
further set of issues concern the rhetorical and terminological choices that further the legitimate purposes 
of the inquiry, e.g., which meaning is, and should be, the dominant public meaning of a term, and what 
considerations are relevant to determining this (Bigelow and Schroeter 2009; Haslanger 2012, Ch 10, Ch 
17). 
For example, the question of what features differentiate males and females – the conditions that 
determine membership in the set of males or females – is a non-trivial matter, and is far from settled 
(Fausto-Sterling 2000a, 2000b, 2005; Richardson 2013).  This can be seen from the controversy over 
Caster Semenya, the South African runner whose female standing was challenged after she won the 800 
meters in the 2009 World Championships, and only reinstated in June 2010.12   We might start by 
considering physical features such as: chromosomes, reproductive organs, and such.  According to 
standard medical dictionaries, a male just is “an individual that produces small usually motile gametes 
(as sperm or spermatozoa) which fertilize the eggs of a female” (MedlinePlus).   This is one way of 
differentiating one set of bodies from another.  There are differences corresponding to these distinctions 
(though the boundaries will be vague).  So simply considered as a distinction, it is neither correct or 
incorrect.  Just as drawing a line between dogs over and under 20lbs is neither correct or incorrect. Such 
differences in weight exist.  But in both cases the question remains whether it is a good way of drawing 
the distinction in question, given our broader purposes. 
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If we accept the MedlinePlus definition of ‘male,’ then in those contexts, the conditions for being 
male are wholly physical. Maleness is anchored by our decision to take physical features to be sufficient 
to determine who counts as male, and maleness is constituted by the physical facts we settle on.  In the 
case of sex, however, there isn’t consensus on the purposes or the conditions for sex distinctions.  Some 
sexologists have included in the basis for sex differentiation developmental features during adolescence, 
e.g., gender identity and role; these have clear social dimensions (Money and Tucker 1976; Fausto-
Sterling 1997). If we authorize these sexologists to anchor what it is to be male, then whether one is male 
or female is also partly a function of non-biological facts, including the individual’s social role.10 On this 
alternative account, then, sex is a social kind.  In other words, on this account, sex is not only anchored 
in, but also  “grounded” or “based in” the social. 
The distinctions I have drawn and the argument I’ve offered may iterate at lower levels.  For 
simplicity, suppose we say that a human male is a human with a penis.  What counts as a ‘penis’ is a 
decision we make in different contexts given our purposes in classifying genitalia. On one view, penises 
are constituted entirely by physical properties.  On an alternative view, however, it might be decided that 
the conditions for being a penis include social functions and/or features, e.g., something is a penis only if 
it is long enough for others to use it as a basis for visual sex identification of someone naked from a short 
distance (3 feet?), or only if it is long enough for penetration during sexual intercourse.11  Such 
controversies might be interpreted as controversies either over anchoring or constitution.  If anchoring, 
then the issue is what features are necessary for something to count as a penis, given the purposes of our 
inquiry and assumptions about what penises are for.  The social and theoretical context might lead to a 
decision to select a particular length range (understood in physical terms) as a condition on being a penis.  
This would be compatible with penises being a purely biological kind, i.e., grounded in biology.  
However, if penises are socially constituted or grounded (not just socially anchored), then being able to 
serve a certain social function would be chosen as part of the conditions for being a penis, in addition to, 
or other than, length and other biological functions.  For example, it would be a condition on being a penis 
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that it be recognizable by others as such, or that it be useable in social settings of intimacy for certain 
activities.   
In the background of this discussion are actual controversies in the context of sex reassignment 
surgery over what it takes for something to be a penis: How important to being a penis is the size, 
appearance, sensitivity, and other biological and social functions?  (Mutatis mutandis for female genitalia 
and other assumed sex characteristics.) For the purposes of this essay, I am neutral on the question of 
whether and to what extent sex and sex organs are socially constituted because I do not think this question 
can be answered in the abstract, apart from a particular purpose for the account being offered.  Instead, I 
defer to the extensive literature on the topic (e.g., Laquer 1990; Kessler 1998; Fausto-Sterling 2000b, 
2005; Warnke 2001; Shrage 2009; Sveinsdóttir 2010; Jordan-Young 2010; Fine 2010).  My point is 
simply to emphasize the different ways that the social context can play a role in distinguishing different 
kinds of things. 
The controversy over whether sex is a physical or social category is a controversy over what 
differentiates the sexes, what differences count and why some (but not other) differences count.  There are 
certainly vested interests at stake and social pressures to select one set of conditions or the other.  
However, if we allow that it is possible (and in some contexts, for some purposes, even reasonable) to 
define sex in physical terms, then the fact that sex distinctions are socially motivated and have a social 
function, is compatible with sex differences being physical.  In such a case, sex would be grounded in the 
physical, in Epstein’s sense. As in the case of distinguishing “Little Dogs” and “Big Dogs,” the anchoring 
facts may depend on social context, “on us” if you like, but social anchoring does prevent a kind from 
being an physical kind.  However, it is a further, and politically important question, who actually gets to 
“define” what ‘male’ and ‘female’ mean and for whom. 
Given this model, one might ask whether all kinds are anchored in the social.  Don’t we similarly 
decide what counts as a tiger or conifer?  Epstein (2015) argues that there are many kinds of “glue” that 
hold kinds together, and that not even all social kinds are anchored in social facts such as human 
convention or stipulation.  Consider private property: suppose we assume, following Locke, that 
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something becomes your property if and only if you mix your labor with it.  We can reasonably ask: by 
virtue of what does mixing one’s labor with an object constitute it as one’s property? This is the anchoring 
question.  A natural rights theorist would argue that this is not simply a matter of convention, but due to a 
kind of natural law.  In other words, the conditions for private property are not anchored by conventions, 
we-intentions, or the like; what constitutes private property is anchored by moral facts that are not 
reducible to social facts.  One might analogously argue that although whether ‘tiger’ refers to the kind 
tigers is anchored by social facts about our use of language, the conditions for being a tiger aren’t up to 
us, but depend on biological and evolutionary facts.  That is, the kind tiger has a biological/historical unity 
“independent” of us. 
5. Anchoring and the Unity of Kinds 
 In the previous section I drew on Epstein’s anchoring/grounding distinction to help clarify certain 
debates over the constitution of social entities.  As Epstein notes, there are two dimensions along which 
social facts might matter for kinds.   Social facts might be included in the conditions for a membership in 
a kind – in Epstein’s words, they might ground (or partly ground) the kind; social facts might also 
determine which conditions count for membership in the kind – in Epstein’s words, they might anchor the 
kind.  On Epstein’s view, we have a possible matrix with all four options open: 
Figure 1 
 Social Grounds Non-social Grounds 
Social Anchor Money, Genders Meters (measurement), Little Dogs (20 lb rule) 
Non-social Anchor (Non-conventionalist) Promising Tigers, Lockean Private Property 
Depending on what definition is apt for what purposes, sex might fit in any of the four boxes.  Yet I think 
there are some confusing aspects of Epstein’s distinctions worth getting clearer about.   
Epstein uses several metaphors in describing anchoring, e.g., anchors set up the “frame” for social 
facts (e.g., 2015b, 72, 74); they are the “glue” that hold the kind together (2015b, 73).  He also suggest 
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that they enable us explain “how we introduce new social objects and kinds into the world”: 
I argue against the idea that there is a single generic method or set of requirements for 
[introducing social kinds]. Instead, there is a variety of what I call "anchoring schemas," or 
methods by which new social kinds are generated. (Epstein 2015a, 41) 
How should we understand this talk of “generating” kinds?  It might appear that Epstein’s picture is this: 
because social kinds are generated by us, they don’t have a “natural” internal unity or cohesion that other 
kinds have.  So when we create them we have to rely on certain anchoring schemas that ensure a 
sufficient unity to qualify the result as a genuine kind.  This is where the metaphor of “glue” seems apt: 
We glue the conditions together by selecting an anchoring schema.  Fortunately, as Epstein points out, we 
don’t have to rely on a single schema.  We have options, e.g., we can anchor kinds functionally by 
determining that the conditions for membership require functional properties, or historically by 
determining that the conditions for membership require historical properties, etc.   
However, this can’t be Epstein’s picture because he also wants to allow that some social kinds 
aren’t anchored socially, i.e., by us.  The fact that anchoring is not only done by us (or us alone) is crucial 
for his critique of Searle, Gilbert, and others (Epstein 2015b, Ch. 4, Ch 8; see also Mason 2015).  So 
anchoring isn’t just something we do to settle conditions for social kinds because they lack sufficient 
unity on their own.  But what anchoring involves remains unclear.  Epstein says: 
Suppose that a given social property or kind has such-and-such instantiation conditions and such-
and-such identity conditions. The anchoring project asks why are these the property or kind's 
instantiation and identity conditions? Or, to put the question slightly differently, why is this the 
property or kind that we have introduced or created? What have we done – or what facts are there 
in the world – that put a given property or kind, having these instantiation and identity conditions, 
in place? As I will term it, what facts anchor the property or kind? (Epstein 2015a, 43) 
Going back to figure 1, it seems that Epstein allows that nature, God, mathematical and moral reality, as 
well as individuals and social groups can anchor kinds.  Anchors don’t just depend on what we do, but 
also “what facts there are in the world.”  If worldly anchors can constitute functional, historical, and 
qualitative social kinds, surely they can do the same for non-social kinds as well.   
To explain why some kind K is the kind it is, we must look to actual objects in the world and the 
properties they have in common. We cannot only look to how we think about some set of objects, 
or how we cognize them. Instead, properties of sets of tokens of K, and the relations among them, 
are part of the "glue" holding together K as a kind. (Epstein 2015a, 48) 
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Hearts are functionally anchored by biology – the biological fact that the conditions for being a heart 
constitute it as something that serves a particular function unites hearts in a kind.  So it would seem that 
Epstein’s account is perfectly general: all kinds have grounds and anchors.   How might this work? 
 Here is another picture: there are many different sorts of kinds, and many ways that conditions 
can unify a group of things.  Some kinds are functional (screwdriver, heart), some are historical (the 
Aldino typeface, homo sapiens), some are qualitative (italic, spherical), and presumably there are other 
sorts of kinds.  It would seem that what distinguishes whether a kind is functional or historical or 
qualitative will depend on the conditions that things must satisfy in order to count as a member of the 
kind in question, i.e., unity amongst the grounds.  For example, a condition on being a screwdriver or 
heart is that it must be capable of (or have at some point been capable of) fulfilling a certain function.   
Epstein and I share a realist assumption that there are all sorts of functional, historical and 
qualitative kinds in the world, regardless of whether we notice them or care about them, etc.  We don’t 
create the kinds tigers or homo sapiens or spheres (though we do create the words and concepts used to 
distinguish them).  Their membership is settled by nature, or mathematical reality, etc. And the kinds 
don’t need “us” to glue them together.  Whether a set of conditions for a kind is functional or historical is 
something we can tell by investigating the kind.  But, as Epstein and I also agree, the same is true for 
many social kinds – we aren’t the source of their unity.  They are unified functionally, historically, 
qualitatively and other ways. (Boyd 1999; Mallon 2003, 2007, 2014; Bach 2012; Mason 2015)  Social 
science, in fact, is in the business of discovering such kinds.  So there is no reason to think that we need 
to provide glue; but then one might wonder, what is this “glue,” and is there a need for “glue” at all?12 
The idea of social kinds being “generated” lends itself to several interpretations; this may be 
where we need further clarity.  On one hand, we generate social kinds and facts by causing artifacts to 
exist: we make bridges, corporations, laws, etc.  Things, come into existence by virtue of our activity, and 
those things fall into kinds.  But we also “generate” kinds by deciding how to understand or group things 
that already exist, by determining what counts as a member of kind K.  For example, the police might 
define what counts as a mob for the purposes policy and training; a medical board might define what 
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counts as male or female; or a university committee might establish a category of MOOC-graders to 
whom certain policies apply.  Once there is a category of MOOC-graders, then of course there can be 
people who identify as MOOC-graders, aim to be MOOC-graders, change the category of MOOC-
graders; this is a well-known looping effect (Hacking 1986).  
However, there is a further way in which kinds function in (social) science.  By making reference 
to a kind in theorizing, the (social) scientist is usually not creating a kind, but is rather describing the 
social world using kind-talk.  Sometimes this requires introducing theoretical terms for the purposes of 
explanation, e.g., ‘inflation,’ ‘scapegoat,’ ‘social capital.’ Of course here too there is a possibility of 
looping effects – social scientific categories can change the world.13  Yet the authority and purposes of the 
university committee or the engineer are different from those of the theorist.  The committee defines the 
social category, and thereby creates the kind of job; the engineer designs and produces the object, and 
thereby creates the kind of artifact; whereas the theorist’s role is, in the primary instance, 
descriptive/explanatory.  Theorists look for the kinds “out there” that are important for our theoretical 
purposes, sometimes creating names for them, or new concepts, even new forms of explanation.  
Admittedly, the theorists creates something new – a new theory, concepts, meanings, or generally, new 
tools for understanding.  These too are artifacts, and they fall into kinds.  But they are socio-cognitive 
artifacts.  And it is not entirely clear how they fit into the Epstein picture I’ve been sketching. 
6.  Anchoring and the Practice of Theorizing 
Let’s return to the example of sex.  As we saw in section §4, there is considerable controversy 
over how to understand the kinds males and females.  There is controversy over the purposes of the 
distinction, over the grounding conditions, over who is authorized to anchor the conditions, over the 
epistemic criteria, and the terms that should be used (Fausto-Sterling 1993, 2000a).  One might suggest 
that the case should simply be settled “by science,” since the distinction is a biological one.  But that begs 
the question about the purposes of the distinction. Moreover, there are a number of different ways of 
sorting the biological facts to yield different legitimate classifications (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Richardson 
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2013).  Although sex is an especially charged case because of the political stakes, the question of kinds – 
which ones to track, how to track them, which ones to create, and how to create them – is always up for 
negotiation.  This falls out of the approach to theorizing I started with.  If a theorist undertakes to study 
sex, there is no value-free starting point, though there may be several that are reasonable. 
How does this bear on anchoring?  Suppose that we undertake to discover what it is to be male 
with the purpose of drawing a distinction among humans (leaving out other animals and non-animals).  
We find that there are several different sets of conditions that constitute relevant kinds: 
• humans with XY chromosomes;  
• humans who produce relatively small motile gametes; 
• humans who produce relatively small motile gametes and no large gametes;  
• humans who produce fertile relatively small motile gametes and no large gametes;  
• humans who exhibit the range of primary and secondary sex characteristics associated with men 
and none associated with women;  
• humans who believe that they are male;  
• humans of whom others believe they are male; 
• humans who function socially as male, etc. 
In other words, suppose there are multiple candidate kinds that are anchored – in the sense that they have 
sufficient “glue” to hold them together – in the domain we are considering.  What next?  How do we 
decide which of the kinds is males?   
This, I think, is a practico-theoretical decision.  As suggested in previous sections, we are not left 
with “anything goes!”  Rather, we must consider carefully the question we are asking, the purposes we 
have in asking the question, and evidence before us.  But given Epstein’s model, there is a problem.  
When we, the theorists, decide that conditions C (rather than C* or C**...) constitute being male, are we 
anchoring maleness?  It would seem not, because, ex hypothesi, the kinds we are considering have 
already been anchored.  They are all sufficiently unified, without our decision concerning what constitutes 
‘males,’ to qualify as kinds as opposed to gerrymandered sets.  And yet, by our decision that C are the 
conditions for being male for the purposes of our inquiry, we are anchoring the kind males.  We are 
making it the case that the conditions C ground maleness.  And this, plausibly, sets the frame for our 
ongoing inquiry.  This is one place where the metaphor of anchors as frames seems especially apt.  
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Anchoring sets a frame that distinguishes what are the important kinds, the ones that are significant for 
the purposes of the inquiry, from the rest.  Because inquiry is a social practice with specific purposes (as I 
outlined in earlier sections), the adequacy of anchoring will always be relative to the practice.  Anchors, 
then, might be seen as an epistemic tool of inquiry and so will be social, whether or not the kind is 
socially grounded. 
Once we see the theorist’s task as one of choosing an apt kind for the purposes of inquiry, this 
allows us to recognize a parallel between theory and other social endeavors.  Consider the committee 
deciding how to define teaching roles and distribute rights and responsibilities.  Here too they are faced 
with a range of possibilities and need to select the kind of role that is apt for the purposes at hand.  
Consider the engineer who is designing a new tool.  She is faced with a range of possible designs and 
needs to select the design that is apt for the purposes the tool must serve.  Consider a sports organization 
such as FIFA that is responsible for setting the rules of soccer.  If they are to do their job well, they 
should not make up rules arbitrarily.  They must select a set of rules – adjusting them over time – that is 
responsive to the purposes of sport (such purposes, of course, being controversial as well).   Does the 
American Psychiatric Association get to make up the rules for sex?  Or perhaps the Department of Motor 
Vehicles? (Please read the sarcasm here!)?14 
Given these parallels, I would like to suggest that it is confusing to use both the metaphors of 
“gluing” and “framing” to characterize anchors.  Gluing and framing are two different tasks, and we 
should not conflate them.  Glue is what holds together a set of conditions that constitute a kind rather than 
an ad hoc set of things.  But even when kinds are glued together, we still need to select from among the 
possible or available ones (constituted by different conditions) those to be used to serve the purposes of 
the project.15  Interestingly, framing – and this is what Epistein focuses on – can add additional unity to an 
otherwise fragmented set of conditions, e.g., because they together have been chosen to serve our needs or 
interests, that otherwise they would lack.  So sometimes framing provides glue, but sometimes glue is not 
necessary because the choice of frame already takes account of the fact that the conditions constitute a 
kind. 
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‘Anchoring’ is Epstein’s word.  Of course it is up to him to decide how to use it.  My sense is that 
he is primarily committed to the ontological project of understanding the kinds of “glue” that hold social 
kinds together.  This is valuable work.  I am more concerned with the practico-theoretical activity of 
choosing a frame, and the role of frames in ideology, in the construction of the social world, but also in 
theorizing more generally.  I am tempted to appropriate the term ‘frame’ for this practio-theoretical 
activity – after all, Epstein didn’t introduce the term.  But I also think it can be useful to select a different 
term so it is clear that our projects are distinct. 
If it is allowable to use the term ‘scaffold’ as both a verb and a noun (which is one of the 
advantages of ‘frame’), then perhaps we can speak of the theorist, the committee, the engineer, as 
scaffolding their projects by relying on kinds or types to canalize their choices.  The animal commission 
scaffolds their policies by defining little dog/big dog in terms of a particular weight (thus ignoring the 
needs of elderly and disabled dogs).  Note that the distinction between dogs weighing >20lbs and those 
weighing <20lbs needs no further unity to do the work needed; the two sets have all the glue they need 
without us.  The engineer scaffolds the project of designing a toy by assuming gender differences,16 
together with gender norms and symbols (thus creating agentic conflicts for non-stereotypical children).  
This choice both depends on a predictable unity of preferences among boys and girls, but also causally 
contributes to further gender unity by reinforcing a binary choice architecture (pink or blue? Transformer 
or pet hospital?).   The United States Treasury approves and the United States Mint produces the 
Sacagawea dollar, thereby creating a new kind of thing.  In this case the scaffolding process is complex, 
for there were many separate decisions that had to be made and approved.  But the process authorized a 
specific design and conditions concerning composition, and the like, that ground the property of being a 
Sacagawea dollar. Traditional political philosophers scaffolded their theories by assuming that citizens 
are independent, able-bodied, rational, plausibly also white and male, adults.   Currently sex is being 
scaffolded by a variety of institutions, and this is aply a topic of political and legal concern.  In each case, 
these are practico-theoretical choices with consequences.  The term ‘scaffold’ also has the advantage that 
it conveys a sense of something complex, often but not always pre-packaged or pre-designed, that used in 
Haslanger          2 June 2015 18 
action, for a purpose, that can collapse under us or be intentionally destabilized. 
Scaffolding is not always conscious or intentional.  It is also not a success term.  Sometimes we 
select the wrong kinds or something that isn’t even, strictly speaking, a kind.  These can be theoretical 
mistakes, or they can be engineering mistakes, or political mistakes (this is not intended as a complete list 
of mistakes!).  Moreover, the collective intentions (or whatever) of a group are not sufficient to constitute 
kind.  Muddled and inapt collective intentions based or false beliefs may still have a huge effect on the 
social world, not initially by constituting kinds – in the sparse sense – but by setting up a scaffold that 
purports to track such kinds, e.g., race, and only later after much damage does so.  Part of the challenge of 
understanding scaffolding is determining when it succeeds in tracking an apt kind, when it causally 
contributes to unifying a kind, and when it creates a kind.  The fact that scaffolding occurs in these 
distinct forms is not a weakness of the concept (a problematic disunity), but an important feature. 
7.  Scaffolding and Mind-Dependence 
 We began this paper with a set of questions about natural kinds and their role in explanation.  
The idea under consideration was that natural kinds are those kinds that play a special role in explanation 
(or play a role in special explanations!), and that in order to play this role, the kinds must be “mind-
independent.”   How does a view like this make sense of artifacts or social kinds?  Does it discredit all of 
social science in one quick move?  I sketched a view of theorizing as a kind of practice, and we 
considered possible sources of mind-dependence on such a model.   
My goal has been twofold.  First, I have indicated how social kinds may be internally and 
objectively unified in a way continuous with physical kinds.  This point has been argued extensively 
elsewhere, so my discussion focused mainly on what it might mean for a social category to be grounded 
in or constituted by physical facts.  Second, I argued that the practice of theorizing is continuous with 
other practices to the extent that theorists, like anyone engaged in a practice, needs to make choices that 
are responsive to purposes (and corresponding values) guiding the practice.  To put it in a Quinean mode, 
however firm we might take our scaffolding for theorizing to be, it is always open, and sometimes 
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mandatory, to recognize that the scaffolding is unsteady or insufficient to take us where we need to go, 
and consequently to shift our weight onto something else to we repair, extend, or abandon the scaffold.  
(Obviously, this is a variation on the theme of Neurath’s boat.) Practical and theoretical rationality are 
interdependent.   Once consequence of this, I think, is that it is rational to accept good theories (criteria 
for which I began to sketch at the end of §2) that will enable us to engage effectively in our practical 
pursuits.  I submit (without argument, though I am hoping it is obvious) that such theories will not be 
restricted to physics and fundamental metaphysics.  However, if we should accept theories that commit 
us to social kinds – whether cockapoos or corporations – then we have reason to accept those kinds as 
real and not demand further reduction that will, even if “successful,” render them less suited to our 
purposes. 
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